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Abstract
We consider the problem of a retailer who implements
supply chain management (SCM) to reduce his own and
suppliers' costs by innovating purchasing processes. We
examine the impact of SCM implementation on the
number of suppliers involved over given time periods. To
address the problem, this paper presents an optimal
contract model that specifies the number of suppliers and
their order volumes and provides that in order to offer the
contract the retailer must have agreements from a desired
number of suppliers to join the supply chain network.
This problem is formulated as a noncooperative game
between the retailer and suppliers.
We found that the high setup cost to suppliers of
joining the SCM decreased the number of suppliers while
at the same time suppliers' benefit (cost reduction)
increased. To gain bargaining power by having many
suppliers, the retailer must choose suppliers who can
anticipate high cost reduction. In addition, this paper
gives managers an insight into the level of information
technology use required to integrate the supply chain.
Keywords: supply chain management, supply chain
contract, game theory, constrained optimization.
Introduction
Supply chain management (SCM) is an
interorganizational information technology that links two
or more related agents by a flow of information, funds,
and goods. The agents in a supply chain may have
conflicting objectives such as profit maximization, better
customer relationships, and more bargaining power. SCM
implementation obviously cannot ignore the relationships
among participating agents (Tsay et al., 1999). We focus
on the relationship between a retailer like Wal-Mart and
its suppliers (manufacturers or wholesalers), where the
retailer repeatedly purchases standardized commodities
from the suppliers and sell them to consumers in the
market.
The retailer implements either a minimum integration
system (Figure 1) or a fully integrated SCM system
(Figure 2). As shown in Figure 1, the minimum
integration system assumes that the supplier can deliver
commodities up to a requested level within a requested
lead-time. It does not check actual available capacity at
the suppliers. This form of SCM employs Internet, EDI,
fax and phone. For this type of SCM, managers and
engineers of the retailer and suppliers should exchange
ideas and data to develop the optimum SCM
(Langenwalter, 2000).
Figure 1. A minimum SCM
The fully integrated system shown in Figure 2 verifies
the capacity information by querying each supplier's
computer before computing its own schedule. The system
requires cooperation on the part of each party because of
the potential failure throughout the information chain
based on electronic links between the retailer's and
suppliers' systems using some form of Internet, EDI, or
private network. (Langenwalter, 2000).
Figure 2. A fully integrated SCM
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How does the integration, whether minimum or full,
affect the relationship between the retailer and its
suppliers? In general, such a SCM implementation
benefits both parties by reducing costs by shortening the
order cycle, easy coordination, and improved inventory
control. By joining the retailer's supply chain, suppliers
can defend product market segments, differentiate the
firm, and develop stronger business relationship with the
retailer. The retailer can maximize its cost reduction by
having all desired suppliers timely joining of the SCM. So
the supply chain contract provided by the retailer should
give incentives for suppliers to join the supply chain.
Offering such incentives become constraints for the
retailer's profit maximization problem. The supply chain
should therefore contract decide the optimal number of
suppliers and their volumes for a given time period
(Figure 3).
Figure 3. A supply chain managment model
Will a fully integrated SCM generate a larger number
of suppliers than the mimimum SCM? Hypothetically,
information technology will increase outsourcing
activities of an organization (Malone et al., 1987). Bakos
and Brynjolfsson(1993) maintain that reduced
coordination costs increase the optimal number of
suppliers but the importance of quality decrease the
number of suppliers. Our contract model provides a
framework to tackle this question. We start from the
assumptions that the investment cost for the SCM
implementation is fixed and the benefit of SCM is ex-post
known to the retailer and suppliers. Given these
assumptions, we find that the optimal number of suppliers
and optimal volume allocation.
A supply chain contract model
A retailer invests in a supply chain management
system and offer n suppliers a contract that specifies a
choice between (a) join supply chain and receive at least
vh order volume for T periods, and (b) not-join and get at
most vl order volume for T periods.
The profit function of a supplier is
where k: SCM setup cost of a supplier,
u: unit profit( i.e., transfer payment less unit cost),
w: supplier's cost reduction,
t: time discount.
We assume setup cost k and unit profit u to be ex-ante
public information and supplier's cost reduction w to be
ex-post private information of each supplier. A supplier
joins in the contract if doing so gives more profit than that
resulting from not joining, such that
…(C1)
Consider now the profit maximization function of the
retailer. We assume market demand is deterministic,
downward-sloping, and private information of the retailer.
The demand q is always the same with the total order
quantity (vhn), so that the retailer does not have an
inventory. That is to say, the retailer changes the price to
sell all units supplied. The retailer's inverse market
demand p(vh, n) is given as p(vh, n)=a- vhn where a is a
market size. The profit function of the retailer is
where K: SCM setup cost of the retailer,
cL : retailer's unit cost if n suppliers join the supply chain.
The retailer's maximization problem is
We solve the nonlinear programming problem using
Kuhn-Tucker (K-T) conditions, which yield a solution
only if the join constraint and non-negative profit
constraint do not bind. The optimal solution (vh*, n*)
satisfies
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There are many choices that satisfy above conditions, all
of which are optimal. If we assume the retailer prefer
maximum number of suppliers, then the optimal solution
is
The optimized profit, price, and demand with any optimal
choice are
From the static analysis of (vh*, n*), we found
The SCM setup costs that suppliers must pay to join
decrease the number of suppliers and the retailer has to
allocate to the suppliers volume proportional to their setup
costs.
It should be noted that suppliers' cost reduction(w) is
ex-post private information. while w decreases volume
and increases the number of suppliers, it does not affect
the profit of the retailer. The profit maximizing retailer
need not consider the cost reduction of each supplier.
However, when the retailer prefers to contract with more
suppliers to reduce the high dependency risk of having
only a few, the retailer may choose suppliers having
potentially high cost-reduction suppliers when seeking to
increase the number of suppliers.
Retailer's cost reduction from utilizing SCM results in
lower price, more demand, and more profit. The cost
reduction is positively related to the amount of SCM
investment in most cases. So the retailer should compare
possible profit outcomes when considering different SCM
options. For example, when choosing between different
types of supply chain such as full integration or minimum
integration, a retailer compares profits of each case. For
example, the retailer will choose full supplier integration
only if it yields better profit than the manual integration ,
i.e.,   where f denote
''full'' and m denote ''minimum'' integration.
Conclusions
We considered the optimization problem of a retailer
who implements SCM. We set up a contract model on
which all suppliers agree. Our analysis explains the
effects of parameters (setup cost and cost reduction). The
cost reductions of suppliers and retailer increase the
optimal number of suppliers while the SCM setup costs to
suppliers reduce that number. For his own profit
maximization, the retailer should be concerned only with
its process innovation available from SCM. However, the
retailer is also concerned with the supplier's cost reduction
because it affects the optimal number of suppliers. The
retailer may choose suppliers having high cost-reduction
potential if they try to avoid high dependency on a few
number of suppliers.
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